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Legalized Gambling Activities: The Issues
Involving Market Saturation*
JOHN WARREN KINDT**

In his classic book entitled Economics,' Nobel-Prize laureate Paul
Samuelson summarized the economics involved in gambling activities as
follows:
There is ...a substantial economic case to be made
First, it involves simply sterile
against gambling.
transfers of money or goods between individuals, creating
no new money or goods. Although it creates no output,
gambling does nevertheless absorb time and resources.
When pursued beyond the limits of recreation, where the
main purpose after all is to "kill" time, gambling subtracts
The second economic
from the national income.
disadvantage of gambling is the fact that it tends to
promote inequality and instability of incomes.2
Furthermore, Professor Samuelson observed that "U]ust as Malthus saw the
law of diminishing returns as underlying his theory of population, so is the
'law of diminishing marginal utility' used by many economists to condemn
professional gambling."3
The concern of the legalized gambling interests over "market
saturation" is largely a non-issue. From the governmental perspective,
focusing on this issue misdirects the economic debate, because fears of
market saturation are predicated upon the unwarranted assumption that
legalized gambling operations constitute regional economic development-which they do not. In reality, legalized gambling operations consist
primarily of a transfer of wealth from the many to the few--accompanied by
the creation of new socio-economic negatives. From the perspective of the
* This analysis deals only with discussions and proposals involving "legal" gambling
impacts.
activities and their socio-economic
** A.B. 1972, William & Mary; J.D. 1976, M.B.A. 1977, University of Georgia;
LL.M. 1978, S.J.D. 1981, University of Virginia; Professor, University of Illinois at UrbanaChampaign.
1. PAUL A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICs 245 (10th ed.).

2. Id. at 425 (footnote omitted).
3. Id. at 426.
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legalized gambling industry, focusing on fears of market saturation largely
constitutes an exercise in arguing over restricting potential competition
and/or guaranteeing market segments via state statutes, instead of engaging
in "pure competition" like most industries.
These issues shouldefirst be examined from the strategic governmental
perspective. In this context, the inherently parasitic manner4 in which
legalized gambling activities must apparently collect consumer dollars to
survive' is frequently described as "cannibalism" of the pre-existing
economy--including the pre-existing tourist industry. According to the
skeptics of legalized gambling activities, this industry-specific phenomenon
means that in comparison with most other industries, legalized gambling
activities must afortiorinot only grow as rapidly as possible, but also grow
as expansively as possible.7 By 1993, the national business press was
beginning to emphasize some of these points and predicted, for example,
that "[p]retty soon, investors and lenders will realize that the gambling
bubble is about to burst."8 However, while the "economic bubble" could
burst in some local areas, as of 1993 there still remained so many markets
and states without extensive legalized gambling activities that the socioeconomic negatives of legalized gambling activities could theoretically
4.

See e.g., ROBERT GOODMAN,

LEGALIZED GAMBLING

AS A STRATEGY FOR

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 51 (Ctr. Econ. Dev., U. Mass.-Amherst 1994) ("Cannibalization:
The Diversion of Dollars From Existing Businesses to Gambling Enterprises"); FLA. DEP'T
COM., IMPLICATIONS OF CASINO GAMBLING As AN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
5, 6 (Bur. Econ. Analysis 1994) ("cannibalization");

N.Y. OFF. ST. COMPTROLLER,

GAMBLING: To STAKE SOMETHING OF VALUE UPON AN UNCERTAIN EVENT

(Off. Fiscal Res.

& Pol'y Analysis 1994) [hereinafter N.Y. COMPTROLLER ANALYSIS]; I. Nelson Rose, The

Rise And Fall Of The Third Wave:

Gambling Will Be Outlawed In Forty Years, in

GAMBLING AND PUBLIC POLICY: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 65, 69 (1991) ("parasitic

... industry"); Press Release, Fla. Dep't Com., "Commerce Analysis: Casinos Bad Bet for
Florida," Sept. 19, 1994, at 1 ("cannibalization" of pre-existing tourism industry). See
generally Hearing on the National Impact of Casino Gambling Proliferation Before the
House Comm. on Small Business, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (Sept. 21, 1994) (testimony of Prof.
Robert Goodman, U. Mass.) [hereinafter Hearing].
5. Id.

6. Id.

7. See CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER & PHILLIP J. COOK, SELLING HOPE 151-54 (Nat'l
Bur. Econ. Research, Harvard Univ. Press 1989). For example, "[i]f lotteries are your only
business, then you expand your business by legalizing lotteries . . . or by increasing
participation in lotteries." Id. at 154, citing a representative of Scientific Games, as quoted
in L.A. Times, October 8, 1984. Obviously, any business would tend to reinvest in itself;
however, in the instance of concentrated legalized gambling activities, this tendency can
intensify the large socio-economic negatives which do not accompany other industries.
8. See Rita Koselka & Christopher Palmeri, Snake Eyes, FORBES, Mar. 1, 1993, at
70, 72. See also Rose, supra note 4, at 70, 82-83.
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9
remain hidden for years until the "bubble burst"--after perhaps 40 years.
In California and Nevada: Subsidy, Monopoly, and Competitive Effects of
Legalized Gambling,'0 the California Governor's Office of Planning and
Research highlighted in December of 1992 "the enormous subsidy that
Californians provide to Nevada through their gambling patronage"" and
concluded that "Nevada derives an enormous competitive advantage from
The report summarized that
its monopoly on legal gambling."' 2
billion per year into Nevada,
$3.8
nearly
"[g]ambling by Californians pumps
and probably adds about $8.8 billion--and 196,000 jobs--to the Nevada
economy, counting the secondary employment it generates" 13 and that this
was "a direct transfer of income and wealth from California to Nevada every
year." 14 Thus, the Nevada economy appears to constitute a classic example
of a legalized gambling economy "parasitically" draining or "cannibalizing"
another economy (primarily Southern California)."5
Arguably, these processes are intensified by the unique aspects involved
in marketing the gambling philosophy, which include "selling
hope"' 6--instead of goods and services. 7 Therefore, when legalized
gambling organizations are compared with traditional businesses and the
industries they represent, the gambling organizations are generally more
sensitive to fears of "market saturation." While traditional businesses may
aggressively compete for consumer dollars, by comparison, the competition
between legalized gambling organizations for consumer dollars can be
fierce,'" because unlike traditional businesses, gambling organizations drain

9. See Rose, supra note 4, at 65, 70, 82-83.

10. CAL. GOVERNOR'S OFF. PLAN. & RESEARCH,

CALIFORNIA AND NEVADA:

(Dec.
1992) [hereinafter SUBSIDY].
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. See supra notes 4-6 and accompanying text for further information on the damages
legalized gambling can do.
16. See generally CLOTFELTER & COOK, supra note 7.
17. It appears that the "recreational gamblers" constituting approximately 80% of the
market (but spending only 35% of the gambling dollars) are receiving a "service" even if
they are receiving no product. See John Warren Kindt, The Economic Impacts of Legalized
Gambling Activities, 43 DRAKE L. REV. 51, 60-61 (1994). It should be noted, however, that
only approximately 35% of each gambling dollar falls into this category, because the other
20% of gamblers (spending 65% of the gambling dollars) are definitely gambling beyond the
limits of "recreation"--with the concomitant economic impacts predicted by Samuelson. Id.
at 60-70. See also supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text for further information.
18. See Rose, supra note 4, at 69. "Competition for the gambling dollar is fierce."
SUBSIDY, MONOPOLY, AND COMPETITIVE EFFECTS OF LEGALIZED GAMBLING ES-1
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local and state economies of consumer dollars by pulling them like an
economic "black hole ' 19 into gambling parlors and the "cluster services"
(i.e., "closely-associated" hotels and restaurants) supporting the gambling
parlors. For example, when the legalization of riverboat gambling was
debated in Illinois, certain gambling maxims were highlighted to the Illinois
Senate Committee conducting hearings.
Our [Nevada] casinos can win because they have long
term traditions and years of experience at the game. They
can and do entrap the gamers in a total gaming ambiance
which includes a full range of complimentary services, not
the least of which in effect producing behaviors is a free
and unlimited flow of alcoholic beverages. Extensive
credit is also provided for players. And the casinos have
high stakes games. High stakes can be won by the player.
High stakes can be lost by the player. The best gamblers
know when to quit. The casinos are designed to persuade
the good gamblers not to quit, certainly not to quit when
they are ahead, or when behind if they have more
resources to gamble.
Money management is the
obligation of the player, and the casino tries very hard to
have the player avoid this obligation. This is why the
casinos win from the players. This is why we are
building three new casino hotels with 4000 rooms each [in
Las Vegas].20
These phenomena lend tangential support to arguments that when legalized
gambling enters an economy, the consumer dollars spent on gambling
,activities result in a net drain and are usually not generating net new orders
for durable and nondurable goods in the pre-existing traditional economy.2'
The basic principle at work in most legalized gambling scenarios is that
"when local people substitute spending on gambling for their other
expenditures, this induced impact has a negative multiplier effect of
decreasing spending on other forms of recreation and businesses in the

Id. See generally,
BUSINESS OF RISK:

VICKI ABT, JAMES F. SMITH, & EUGENE M. CHRISTIANSEN, THE
COMMERCIAL GAMBLING IN MAINSTREAM AMERICA (1985).

19. Alf Siewers, Casino hopes and fears, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 12, 1992, at 1, 67
(citing to I. Nelson Rose, Whittier Law School).
20. Hearings on S.B. 572 Before the Ill. Sen. Comm. on Riverboat Gambling, at 3
(1989) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of William Thompson, Professor of Mgmt. & Pub.
Admin., University of Nevada, Las Vegas).
21. GOODMAN, supra note 4, at 50.
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area. '' 22 The gambling interests argue that the dollars they take in are
"entertainment dollars" or "recreational dollars." This observation is valid
with regard to approximately 35% of the "gambling dollar," but it is invalid
with regard to the remaining 65%.23 Opponents of legalized gambling
argue that there are also differences because the entertainment dollars spent
on a movie, for example, largely generate more movies, and recreation
dollars spent on a speedboat, for example, largely generate orders for more
speedboats. Accordingly, while most entertainment or recreational dollars
contribute to a positive multiplier effect, legalized gambling dollars result
in a negative multiplier effect. 24 This negative impact apparently occurs,
in part, because approximately two-thirds of the gambling dollars are not
25
recreationally-oriented, but are spent by a compulsive market segment
reacting to an addictive activity--probable or possible pathological
gambling--as delimited by the American Psychiatric Association.26
Opponents also note that gambling dollars spent in a legalized gambling
facility are usually reinvested in more gambling facilities--which just
intensifies the socio-economic negatives associated with gambling activities
and "reduces the national income" even further.2
Notably, gambling "winnings" to one gambler do not come from the
gambling parlor but from the pockets of other gamblers. Since dollar
winnings (and not entertainment enjoyments) constitute the rationale for
many gamblers to gamble, the gamblers in this category are not provided
entertainment per se when they gamble. Furthermore, skeptics question
whether a person who earns $30,000 per year really experiences $3,000
worth of "entertainment" when that $3,000 is lost in one night.
A summary of these concepts reveals that when compared to legalized
gambling parlors, pre-existing entertainment activities in the United States
generally create and contribute to a positive economic cycle, and they do not
leave behind the enormous social problems inherent in gambling economies.
As previously mentioned, an exception appears to occur when a small
gambling economy is subsidized by a large non-gambling economy (for
example, Nevada vis-a-vis California). 28 However, when viewed from the

22. Id.
23. See Kindt, supra note 17 and accompanying text.
24. GOODMAN, supra note 4, at 50.
25. See, e.g., Kindt, supra note 17, at 60-61.
26. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL

DISORDERS

7.

§ 312.31, at 324-25 (3d rev. ed. 1987).

27. See SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 425; see also CLOTFELTER &
28. See, e.g.,

SUBSIDY,

supra note 10.

COOK,

supra note
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proper perspective, whether regional or strategic in scope, legalized
gambling activities always drain the relevant economic base. For example,
it was emphasized to the Illinois Senate Committee on riverboat gambling
that "[t]he money spent on riverboats will be drained off other portions of
the Illinois economy." 29 Similarly, "Iowa [erroneously] thought it would
have a monopoly with its riverboat 30gambling, a parasitic casino industry
growing fat off the Chicago market.
In an economic scenario, dollars spent in gambling parlors are often
removed from circulation, and this process contributes to a negative
economic impact.3 Most revenues to the legalized gambling organizations
must necessarily be directed primarily into attracting new consumer markets
or toward increased marketing efforts to keep "selling hope" 32 to
pre-existing gamblers. 3
Gambling organizations argue that spending
dollars on, for example, slot-machines is spending money on durable goods,
but once again, skeptics counter that the industry is predicated upon policies
which keep their dollars "in-house" and that even the manufacturing
orders for gambling-oriented machines only constitute orders to the "cluster
services." Furthermore, it is argued that gambling-oriented machines
perform no useful task, and therefore national, as well as local, productive
capacity is better directed toward manufacturing appliances or other
machines.
Once again, the net result according to Professor Jack Van Der Slik,
who echoed the sentiments of much of the academic community, was that

29. Hearings,supra note 20, at 6.
30. Rose, supra note 4, at 69. Theoretically, the negative economic spiral can only
be overcome by large numbers of tourists from outside of the localized economy. In Nevada,
for example, over 90% of the tourists are from out of state. Hearings,supra note 20, at 5.
This "tourist factor" generally requires that 50-94% of the gambling patrons must
come from outside of the localized economy. Moreover, these tourists cannot be pre-existing
tourists visiting non-gambling tourist attractions. For example, in Niagara Falls, New York,
the introduction of legalized gambling, such as casino gambling would basically thrive off
of the 10% of the pre-existing tourist dollars who would definitely gamble and another 42%
who would "tend to gamble" in the casinos. In other words, 10-52% of the pre-existing
tourist dollars would leave the pre-existing tourist trade and migrate to the casinos. See, e.g.,
Kindt, supra note 17, at 60-70.
31. See supra notes 19-26 and accompanying text.
32. See generally CLOTFELTER & COOK, supra note 7; Hearings, supra note 20, at 3.
33. For analyses relating to the psychological aspects of why people will gamble and
will continue to gamble, see Igor Kusyszyn, The Psychology of Gambling, 474 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 133 (1984); Ellen J. Langer, The Psychology of Chance, 7 J.
THEORY Soc. BEHAV. 185 (1978); Richard N. Rosett, Gambling and Rationality, 73 J. POL.
ECON. 595 (1965).
34. See Hearings, supra note 20, at 3 and accompanying text.
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state-sanctioned "gambling produces no product, no new wealth, and so it
makes no genuine contribution to economic development. '35 Similarly, in
1989 Professor William Thompson cautioned that Illinois riverboat gambling
would "not be a catalyst for general economic development. 36 Of course,
if the focus is only on a localized gambling area, such as Las Vegas,
instead of the proper perspective on the overall region Las Vegas is
draining, there can be the illusion of an overall positive economic impact. 37
Most insidious to traditional businesses and to the rest of the economy,
practically all of the dollars flowing into gambling organizations are
"reinvested" in more and newer and "harder" forms (i.e., "more thrilling"
forms) 3 of gambling, as well as their associated cluster services. This
process tends continually to intensify the large socio-economic negatives (as
well as the local positives) associated with legalized gambling activities. In
other words, the truism "gambling begets gambling"39 appears accurate, and
the gambling dollars are almost exclusively kept "in-house"4" despite the
protestations of the gambling supporters to the contrary.41

35. Jack R. Van Der Slik, Legalized gambling: predatory policy, ILL. ISSUES, Mar.
1990, at 30, 30.
36. Hearings, supra note 20, at 6.
37. See generally SUBSIDY, supra note 10.

38. For an analysis of the "thrill factor" or "sensation seeking in gamblers," see Kenny
R. Coventry & R. lain F. Brown, Sensation Seeking in Gamblers and Non-Gamblers and its
Relation To Preferencefor Gambling Activities, Chasing, Arousal and Loss of Control in
Regular Gamblers, in GAMBLING BEHAVIOR AND PROBLEM GAMBLING 25 (1993).

39. Rose, supra note 4, at 69.
40. See Hearings, supra note 20, at 3.
41. These economic factors which are unique to legalized gambling organizations,
arguably make it inappropriate to utilize the economic multipliers provided by the Bureau
of Economic Analysis of the U.S. Department of Commerce. Legalized gambling activities
need their own sets of multipliers because legalized gambling activities have special aspects
associated with them. In many instances, the nationwide growth of legalized gambling
activities during the 1990s has basically started from zero, and therefore, the historical data
bases essential for establishing and recalculating the proper economic multipliers are largely
unavailable. In the interim, the legalized gambling organizations have had to be viewed as
traditional businesses without inculcating the industry-specific negatives unique to legalized
gambling, and accordingly, economic multipliers have often been utilized without considering
the negatives. See, e.g., ILL. ECON. & FISCAL COMM'N, WAGERING IN ILLINOIS 6 (1992)
[hereinafter ILL. ECON. COMM'N].
In this report, for example, more calculations,
illustrations, and explanations of the multipliers and input-out models which were utilized
should have been presented. Id. at 36, 52-58 (omitting the multiplier calculations, but giving
the results). These omissions may have been an oversight, but the tenor of the report reflects
a type of uneasiness with the positives that the multipliers tend to highlight. For example,
the report opines that "[t]o apply the State multipliers to the Lottery, in our opinion, would
tend to overstate its impact on other sectors of the Illinois economy." Id. at 71. This
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The drain on economies is real, but obviously, the bigger the economy
of the anticipated gambling market, the longer this draining can occur
without being noticed by the public. In fact, it could transpire over a course
of years if the market was big enough and unsaturated by competition from
other gambling interests. These principles highlight some of the reasons that
the legalized gambling interests were anxious42 to locate a $2-billion casino
complex in the heart of Chicago, which has a huge economy and a large
population base which can be tapped.43 It also reinforces claims by
gambling opponents that these same casino interests were largely

uneasiness adds to the credibility of the report and its authors. This report evidences that it
is probably beginning to recognize some of the problems inherent in applying economic
multipliers to legalized gambling. For updated analyses relating to this 1992 report, see ILL.
ECON. & FISCAL COMM'N, WAGERING IN ILLINOIS: A REPORT UPDATING THE ECONOMIC
IMPACT OF GAMBLING ACTIVITIES (1994) [hereinafter ILL. ECON. COMM'N UPDATE 19941.

Accordingly, the standard economic multipliers need to be specialized and
recalculated to incorporate the negative as well as the positive economic impacts unique to
legalized gambling activities. As of 1993, the relevant data was still in the process of being
generated, but in the interim, all economic multipliers applied to legalized gambling activities
should be accompanied by a caveat. Id. at 6.
The field research and the computer models in progress by Economics Professor Earl
Grinols of the University of Illinois have led the field in these issue areas.
For a localized example recommending that the specialized New Jersey multipliers
be updated and indicating the difficulties of accomplishing this task, see N.J. GOVERNOR'S
ADV. COMM'N ON GAMBLING, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1988) [hereinafter N.J.
ADV. COMM'N].

42. See Fran Spielman, Casino Ultimatum, CHI. SUN-TIMES, July 10, 1992, at 1, 34.
Among other promises, "casino developers ... offered to offset losses incurred by the horse
racing industry by subsidizing a $25 million tax break or by making racetrack owners a
'fourth partner' in their proposed $2 billion casino/entertainment complex in downtown
Chicago." Id. at 1, 34. It was reported that offers from the casino sponsors not to compete
or to waive the sports betting aspects of the casino complex were also apparently conveyed
to the legalized racing interests by Caesars World President J. Terrence Lanni. Lanni
portrayed the offer as a life preserver to a dying industry.
"If we lose this proposal and you never see me again, the racing industry will be
dead in Illinois before the turn of the century," he said. "The racing industry needs
something. Our proposal and the money they would make from it would allow that
industry to flourish and grow."
Tom Carey, president and general manager of Hawthorne Racecourse,
called Lanni's prediction "ridiculous."
Id. at 34.
43. The relevant populations to be considered would include, for example: Chicago
at 2.8 million, Cook County at 5.1 million, DuPage County at .78 million, and nearby
populations in other states. BUR. CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T COM., 1990 CENSUS, as reported in
THE WORLD ALMANAC 406, 432-33 (1993). Of course, the Chicago population is subsumed
in the Cook County numbers.
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posturing" when they indicated that they would build a similar project in
Milwaukee, Wisconsin,45 or Gary, Indiana46 if Illinois did not approve a
Chicago casino complex. In other words, the population demographics and
the size of the local economies were much less favorable than those of
Chicago.47 According to skeptics; the Chicago casino interests were
hesitant about locating scaled-down casinos in Milwaukee or Gary, because
the project's supporters recognized that with enough public relations
hyperbole, they would probably eventually gain approval for their Chicago
casino complex and they did not want to compete with themselves--at least,
initially. Of course, if the Chicago situs was ever ruled out as an option for
the foreseeable future, then scaled-down casinos (or even riverboats) in
Milwaukee or Northern Indiana would become the only alternatives for the
legalized gambling interests.
According to critics, the gambling interests recognize that the
proliferation of the gambling philosophy nationwide,48 which those
interests have spent large public relations dollars to promote,49 constitutes
a type of salvation for the industry. 0 Localized gambling organizations
have difficulties once they have saturated the local market, 5' because by
definition they almost invariably generate a negative economic spiral. 2
The negative economic impacts have repeatedly been described as a "black
hole" of economics5 3 because legalized gambling organizations can take
large dollar amounts out of local and/or regional economies,5 4 such as $1

44. See Spielman, supra note 42, at 1, 37.
45. The population of Milwaukee, Wisconsin is 628,000. THE WORLD ALMANAC 428
(1993).
46. The population of Gary, Indiana is 117,000. Id. at 408.
47. Due to its central-location, a casino complex in Chicago could tap all of the
relevant population bases, whereas a casino in Milwaukee, Wisconsin or Gary, Indiana would
be on the outskirts of the prime population areas. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying
text.
48. See generally Rose, supra note 4.
49. For example, $16.5 million was spent to promote casino-style gambling in Florida
in 1994. Louis Lavelle, Voters deal loss to casinos: Gambling backers lose despite $16.5
million campaign, TAMPA TRIBUNE (Tampa, Fla.), Nov. 9, 1994, at 1, 5; Casinos gamble,
and lose, again, FLORIDA SUN, Nov. 9, 1994, § A, at 1, 6 ($16.7 million.spent by casino

proponents in Florida).
50. See generally Rose, supra note 4.
51. See, e.g., ILL. ECON. COMM'N UPDATE 1994, supra note 41, at 6, 9-10.
52. See SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 425; see also supra notes 19-26 and
accompanying text.
53. Siewers, supra note 19, at 1, 67; I. Nelson Rose, Gambling And The Law--Update:
1992 4-5 (1992) (unpublished article, available from I. Nelson Rose, Whittier Law School).

54. See, e.g., Alf Siewers, $1 Billion Gambled Away on Riverboats" Ripple Effect of
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billion lost on Illinois riverboats in 1994.55 For example, when a "casino
is located in a closed community [that is, without massive tourism], it acts
like a black hole, sucking the money out of the local population."56
Furthermore, "[a]round the world and throughout history every society that
has allowed casinos to cater to local customers has eventually outlawed
gambling." 7
Generally, the expansion of gambling is accomplished in two basic
ways. Arguably, one method is for the marketing techniques to become
increasingly seductive.58 However, before employing this methodology, the
gambling interests will typically try to go to theoretically "harder and
harder" forms of gambling, which can be broadly defined as those forms of
gambling which sociologists calculate have more of a "thrill" factor
interfacing with mechanisms to "chum" the gambling dollar as quickly as
possible in the gambling environment. These forms of gambling run the
gambit59 to follow "the domino effect" 6 from the state, lottery, to what
legalized gambling interests can specifically control; that is, to dog and
horse tracks, to off-track betting parlors, to riverboat gambling, to
land-based casino gambling, to in-store video-machine gambling, to in-home
Riverboats, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Oct. 2, 1994, at 1, 18. "Gamblers lost nearly $1 billion on
Illinois riverboats from August, 1993, to Sept. 1 of ...[1994]." Id. at 1.
55. Id. Of course, some of this $1 billion was resiphoned into local communities to
pay for local goods and services, as well as wages. These expenditures would apparently
assist local economies, except that these dollars were already assisting the local economy as
"consumer dollars" before they were transformed into "gambling dollars." Once again, it
should be noted that massive numbers of new tourists are required for local economies to
break even. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
56. Rose, supra note 53, at 4-5.
57. Id. at 5, referencing, SCARNE, SCARNE'S COMPLETE GUIDE TO GAMBLING 215
(1961).
58. See, e.g., Nancy Millman, A Little Lotto means a lot in hard-sell ad campaign,
CHI. TRIB., Aug. 2, 1992, § 7C, at 1, 2. "Historically, the [Illinois] lottery's weakest game,
Little Lotto was recommended for the scrap heap by several.., ad agencies...." Id. This
game generated new sales by advertising "the odds be with you." Id. at 2. Of course, if this
advertising had been other than state-sanctioned, it would allegedly have constituted
misleading advertising. See also Mich. Att'y Gen. Frank J.Kelley, Address at the Int'l
Conference on Gambling (Feb. 11, 1994). For several examples of state "advertising that...
is deceitful and corrosive," see Joshua Wolf Shenk, Everyone's a Loser: How lottery ads
entice the wrong people to gamble, WASH. MONTHLY, July-Aug. 1995, at 22, 22. For
proposed federal legislation "[T]o assure that advertisements by states for participation in
their lotteries are subject to regulation by the Federal Trade Commission" (i.e., truth-inadvertising standards), see H.R. 327, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995) (introduced by U.S.
Representative Jim McCrery).
59. See, e.g., Rose, supra note 4, at 67-69.
60. Id. at 68.
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video gambling, to a never-ending process of increased mechanisms to
"chum" the gambling dollar faster until it is left within the gambling
environment. 61 Furthermore, it is a fundamental economic principle that:
"Actually, in all professional gambling arrangements, the participants lose
out on balance. The leakage comes from the fact that the odds are always
rigged in favor of the 'house,' so that even an 'honest' house will win in
the long run."'62 Accordingly, if any given gambling interest can control
more than one of the major categories of legalized gambling, it is lucrative
to do so. If control cannot be maintained over more than one category, the
gambling organizations must go to "harder and harder" forms of gambling
within each category to increase the "thrill '63 by changing or proliferating

61. For examples of the debates involving the migration of gambling dollars, see D.

WEINSTEIN & L. DEITCH, THE IMPACT OF LEGALIZED GAMBLING: THE SOCIOECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES OF LOTTERIES AND OFF-TRACK BETTING (1974); 0. David Gulley & Frank

A. Scott, Jr., Lottery Effects on Pari-MutualTax Revenues, 42 NAT'L TAX J. 89 (1989); John
A. Mikesell, The Effect of Maturity and Competition on State Lottery Markets, 6 J. POL'Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 251 (1987); William F. Reed, Fading Fast: Thoroughbredracing in the
U.S. is being run into the ground by off-track betting and other legalized gambling, SPORTS
ILLUSTRATED, Apr. 22, 1991, at 90; Susan A. Simmons & Robert Sharp, State Lotteries'
Effects on ThoroughbredHorse Racing, 6 J. POL'Y ANALYSIS & MANAGEMENT 446 (1987).
See also Ctr. Bus. & Econ. Res., C. Bus. & Econ., U. Ky., Understanding the Impact of the
Equine Industry in Kentucky and the Central Bluegrass (Spring 1992). See generally
Bernstein, A Critique of Thalheimer's Analysis of New Jersey Racing (DePaul Univ., Dep't
Econ. 1992) (apparently sponsored by the proponents of legalized casino gambling in
Chicago).
62. SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 425 n.6. Despite Professor Samuelson's reference
to illegal gambling activities, all references in this analysis are to "legal" gambling activities.
Discussions of any allegedly illegal activities and their impacts are beyond the scope of the
present analysis.
63. For discussions involving the interface between risk and choice, see R. HOGARTH,
JUDGMENT AND CHOICE (1980); Milton Friedman & L. J. Savage, The Utility Analysis of
Choices Involving Risk, 56 J. POL. ECON. 279 (1948); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky,
Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); see
also Ellen J. Langer, The Illusion of Control, 32 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 311
(1975). See generally H. Roy Kaplan, Gambling among Lottery Winners: Before and After
the Big Score, 4 J. GAMBLING BEHAV. 171 (1988).
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the games. 6" Some common techniques for increasing the thrill of the
gambling itself include raising the betting limits, changing the game
slightly,65 or enhancing the glitz.' Techniques for increasing the thrill
of the gambling environment include providing shows and promoting open
liquor licenses.6 7 According to critics of legalized gambling activities, if
this process ever stops, the gambling organization stagnates by feeding only

64. This essential process of changing and proliferating the games can be readily
demonstrated in state lotteries. ILL. ECON. COMM'N, supra note 41, at 65 (Table); ILL.
ECON. COMM'N UPDATE 1994, supra note 41, at 17 (Table).

Fiscal
Year

LOTTERY SALES BY GAME, TOTAL SALES, TRANSFERS
AND PROFIT MARGIN FY 1975-FY 1993
Total Lottery Profit
Pick
Little
50 cents
Four
Lotto
Sales Trans. Margin
Lotto
and $1 Instant Daily
$129
$107

$ 50
$ 32
$ 20
$ 14
$8

$ 129
$ 164
$ 133

$ 57
$ 63

$ 90

$ 58

$ 56
$ 41
$ 43
$ 78
$158
$197
$234
$238
$227
$260
$322
$341
$365
$406
$493

$ 42

$164
$248
$284
$367
$356
$348
$335
$353
$370
$383
$369
$362
$348

$ 18
$ 46
$ 49
$ 75
$ 88
$ 93
$106
$ 19
$114
$109
$112
$112

$ 27
$299
$567
$642
$679
$601
$607
$589
$601
$634
$490

$ 16

$164
$144
$123
$123
$130

$ 76
$ 97
$ 215
$ 344
$ 515
$ 912
$1,232
$1,316
$1,334
$1,336
$1,482
$1,571
$1,567
$1,637
$1,573

$ 54

$ 78
$ 41
$ 33
$ 32
$ 32
$ 69
$138
$215
$358
$506
$552
$553
$524
$586
$594
$580
$610
$588

41.9%
47.6%
41.6%
36.7%
42.1%
33.0%
32.1%
40.1%
41.7%
39.3%
41.1%
41.9%
41.5%
39.2%
39.5%
37.8%
37.0%
37.3%
37.4%

Regardless of these attempts to keep growing, 11 of the 34 state lotteries existing
in 1991 (including Washington, D.C.) showed declines in 1991. Millman, supra note 58, at
2.
65. With regard to the Illinois lottery in 1992, the State commissioned the Bozell
Company of Chicago to conduct the first major segmentation study for a state lottery. "The
study revealed that even within a category such as instant games, different players gravitate
to sports games, casino tickets or the more fanciful instants like a 'treasure hunt'.
Millman, supra note 58, at 2.
66. Id. For an analysis of how these techniques interface with compulsive gambling,
see Henry R. Lesieur, Compulsive Gambling, SOCIETY, May/June 1992, at 43, 43-44.
67. See id.; Hearings, supra note 20, at 3.
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off of problem gamblers who will eventually lose everything and be
financially exhausted.68
Typically, a state lottery constitutes the softest form of legalized
gambling, because the time-lag between placing a bet and learning the
results is often measured in days.69 However, even in a state where the
lottery is the only form of legalized gambling, the "pots" must keep
increasing and the "lottery games" must keep changing to attract the 52
percent (or more) of the public which can be enticed into gambling.70
Even so, a percentage of the public can be initially enticed to gamble
regardless of the games available and these "compulsive economic
gamblers" constitute 1.5-5% of the public after the "legalization" of
gambling, but only .77% of the public if there is no legalized gambling.7'
In 1979, for example, Governor James Thompson of Illinois publicly
suggested that the state lottery which had been selling tickets since July of
1974 would have to be eliminated if more people did not gamble.72 The
so-called "salvation" of the Illinois state lottery was the initiation in 1980 of
a daily numbers game,73 which was followed by "Pick Four" in 1982,
"Lotto" in 1983, and "Little Lotto" in 1988. 74
This simple illustration demonstrates how even the softer forms of
gambling must continually expand to survive because gambling interests are
really selling nothing but "hope," and this hope is never realized in the
long-term because "the house always wins eventually. 7 5 Importantly, it
should also be noted that the states directly and indirectly hide the true odds
of winning from the public. 76 This policy hurts the credibility of elected
governmental officials and of government in general.77 The advertising
68. "[M]any players go broke, a mathematical certainty known as 'gambler's ruin."'
Rose, supra note 53, at 4.
69. The less the time-lag between the bet and the results, the more the money "chums"
and the faster it stays with the house. Generally, more of the "thrill" factor or "chase" factor
is also present. Therefore, state lotteries will tend toward reducing the time-lag and
permitting more "instant games" and video lottery terminals, which minimize the time-lag.
70. ILL. ECON. COMM'N, supra note 41, at 65 (Table); ILL. ECON. COMM'N UPDATE
1994, supra note 41, at 17 (Table); see CLOTFELTER & COOK, supra note 7, at 92-93; see
also Mark Edward Stover, Contiguous State Lotteries: Substitutes on Complements?, 9 J.
POL'Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 565 (1990).
71. See CLOTFELTER & COOK, supra note 7, at 124-25; Kindt, supra note 17, at 64-65.
72. CLOTFELTER & COOK, supra note 7, at 5-6.
73. Id. at 6.
74. ILL. ECON. COMM'N, supra note 41, at 65 (Table); ILL. ECON. COMM'N UPDATE,
supra note 41, at 17 (Table).
75. Rose, supra note 53, at 4.
76. See Kelley, supra note 58.
77. Id.
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associated with state lotteries also directly attacks the principle that "a public
office is a public trust."78 However, the advertising for all types of
legalized gambling interests must necessarily become harder and
increasingly misleading. 79 By definition, this process can never stop until
the legalized gambling once again becomes illegal, or until the relevant
economy is so completely drained that the economy sinks into a recession,
or even a localized depression.
The process of a state deceiving its own citizenry was again
demonstrated by the State of Illinois in its 1992 campaign to entice the
public into playing a revised "game": namely, Little Lotto. This game was
touted by the marketing gimmick, "the Wizard of Odds," who breathlessly
announced "the odds be with you."80 Of course, this was untrue. The odds
are never with the gambler.8' This example re-emphasized that state
deceit and harder and harder
governments must utilize more and more
82
gimmicks to keep the public "playing.,
From the perspective of public policy, state-sanctioned methods of
misleading the public involving the odds of winning lotteries undermine the
basic tenets of good government. But for legalized gambling to survive,
these techniques must necessarily continue to increase in scope and
intensity.83 As distinguished from this state-sanctioned advertising of the
lotteries, any "business person" utilizing such advertising would allegedly
be engaged in fraud.84 Gambling and the gambling philosophy, and the
marketing techniques which must be utilized to support these philosophies,
are directly opposed to sound business principles and economic
Accordingly, elected governmental officials need to
development.
re-examine their infatuation with gambling and the gambling philosophy.
Since the inception of the Flamingo casino in 1942,85 major legalized

78. President Grover Cleveland, in JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONs 771 n.1
(14th ed. 1968). The Cleveland Administration utilized this phrase as its motto. Id. This
principle was also referenced by Matthew Henry, Edmund Burke, Thomas Jefferson, Henry
Clay, John C. Calhoun, and Charles Sumner. Id. at 386, 454, 472, 538, 545, 659.
79. See supra notes 58-67 and accompanying text.
80. Millman, supra note 58, at 1, 2. See also Kelley, supra note 58; Shenk, supra note
58, at 22-25.
81. See generally Jeryl L. Mumpower, Lottery Games and Risky Technologies:
Communications About Low-Probability/High-ConsequenceEvents, 8 RISK ANALYSIS 231
(1988).
82. Id.; Rose, supra note 4, at 67-69.
83. See Rose, supra note 4, at 67-69.
84. See Kelley, supra note 58; Shenk, supra note 58, at 22.
85. Various forms of gambling were first legalized in Nevada in 1931. See
CLOTFELTER & COOK, supra note 7, at 41. See generally Mark H. Hailer, The Changing
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gambling in Nevada has usually helped that state's economy, because until
1977 Nevada was the only place for legalized casino gambling in the United
States. Nevada attracted many "tourists," including compulsive gamblers
(.77-5% of the population), problem economic gamblers8 6 (10%),7 and
others (42%).88 Due to the geographic distances involved, the 1976 advent
of casino gambling in Atlantic City, New Jersey, probably impacted only
slightly on the Nevada economy--except for the impact of losing the
compulsive gamblers then being generated in the areas of Pennsylvania,
New Jersey, and New York.
However, the proliferation of state lotteries during the 1980's generated
real fears among the Nevada gambling interests of "market saturation,"
because persons inclined to gamble and the newly-generated gamblers could
stay in their geographic areas and gamble (known as the "accessibility"
factor). These real fears escalated in 1991, when it became apparent that
casino gambling on the California Indian reservations could intercept and
destroy 10% (and probably impact another 42%) of the "tourists" coming
from Southern California to Las Vegas and from Northern California to
Reno, Nevada.8 9 To combat this trend toward market saturation, the

Nevada gambling interests immediately looked to expand to Chicago, New
Orleans, Washington, D.C., and other U.S. population centers. 9°
There was one enormous plus which would assist not only the Nevada
gambling organizations, but also all gambling interests. Once gambling was
legalized in a state, even in the soft format of a state lottery, a whole new

Structure of American Gambling in the Twentieth Century, 35 J. Soc. ISSUES, no. 3, 1979,

at 87.

86. The term "problem economic gamblers" (PEGs) is not synonymous with the

sociological definition for "problem gamblers," and these terms should not be confused.
Kindt, supra note 17, at 60, 77-78.
87. The percentage of the population who will become compulsive gamblers after
gambling is "legalized" is 1.5-5%, and the 10% who will become problem economic
gamblers includes this 1.5-5%. Id.; see also CLOTFELTER & COOK, supra note 7, at 92-94.
88. The total percentage of the public which will gamble once gambling is legalized
is 52%. See CLOTFELTER & COOK, supra note 7, at 92-94. These percentages are apparently
moving upward as legalized gambling activities continue to gain sociological acceptance.
See Lesieur, supra note 66, at 43 (stating movement up from 61% in 1974, 71% of the public
was gambling by 1989). These percentages refer to the local populations which will
definitely gamble. The interface between the number of so-called "tourists" which fall into
these categories vis-a-vis the percentages of the resident population which fall into these
categories, become convoluted in the case of Nevada.
89. See, e.g., BETTER GOV'T Assoc., STAFF WHITE PAPER: CASINO GAMBLING IN
CHICAGO app. R (1992) (copies available from Better Gov't Assoc., Chicago, I1l.).
90. Id. apps. 0, P, Q.
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gambling public was being generated.9 By enacting legislation which
stated that legalized gambling was sociologically acceptable (known as the
"acceptability" factor), the percentages of the public which could be
persuaded to gamble could be expected to increase by at least 100-6,600%
to include up to 52% of the total population. 92 Despite the new elements
of the population being introduced to gambling, the 1964-1984 proposals to
enact a California state lottery93 drew large protests from Nevada and its
gambling interests94--even though a lottery was a "softer" form of gambling
than the segments which were prevalent in the Nevada gambling markets.
This scenario was compounded by the proposals of the Indian reservations
in California to initiate various forms of hard gambling, including casino
gambling. In other words, the potential competition from California was
becoming too proximate to the traditional market.95 Thereafter, this fear
of "market saturation" was poignantly emphasized to the Nevada gambling
interests,96 because for basically the first time, many Nevada casinos were
facing long-term financial trouble and the national press was aware of this-as may have been exemplified by some Las Vegas examples. "Old-line
gambling dens like the Riviera, the Aladdin and the Dunes, once the lairs
of high rollers brandishing pinkie rings while running up big losses on the
tables, all recently have been in and out of bankruptcy .

.

. .

9

By

comparison, within a year after land-based casino gambling began in three
Colorado mining towns in 1991, four of the smaller casinos had closed and
several others were for sale.98 By 1993, of the approximately 100 casinos
which had opened since 1991, 33 were closed or had been bought by
competitors."

"Some 50% .

. [were] probably losing money."' °

Within 2 years after casino gambling began in Deadwood, South Dakota on
91. CLOTFELTER & COOK, supra note 7, at 124-25; see also ILL. ECON. COMM'N,
supra note 41, at 66-67; ILL. ECON. COMM'N UPDATE 1994, supra note 41, at 17-19; Rose,
supra note 4, at 66-69.
92. The range calculation is: (1.5-.77) + .77 -

(52-.77) + .77 = 95% -- 6,650%.

93. CLOTFELTER & COOK, supra note 7, at 151-54.
94. See I. Nelson Rose, Current Issues In Gambling Laws, 8 WHIITIER L. REV. 245,
251 (1986).
95. See generally SUBSIDY, supra note 10, at ES-4.
96. Id.; see also James Coates, Vegas' Tip To Chicago: Casino is Family Fun, CHI.
TRIB., Apr. 10, 1992, § 1, at 1, 10. Those casinos which were still thriving, and there were
several, were placing large dollar amounts into marketing to attract the gambling dollars. See

id.

97. Coates, supra note 96, at 10.
98. Marj Charlier, The Payoff.: Casino Gambling Saves Three Colorado Towns But
the Price Is High, WALL ST. J., Sept. 23, 1992, at Al, A6.
99. Koselka & Palmeri, supra note 8, at 70, 71.
100. Id. at 71.
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November 1, 1989, half of the casinos were in financial trouble. 0 1
Furthermore, only 5 of the 12 Atlantic City casinos were profitable in
1990102 and by 1991 and 1992, half of the casinos were in financial
trouble and seven (out of thirteen) had been through bankruptcy.'0 3
Market saturation was apparently not only occurring, but also occurring
more quickly in those "isolated" community areas with casino gambling. By
January 1994, three of Iowa's five riverboats had left."04 Some state
legislators were becoming disgruntled and disenchanted.'0 5 "We're in a
race to the bottom with each state requiring the stakes to be raised and taxes
lowered," says Iowa state representative Robert Rafferty. "We're all now
16
competing for a lower class of gambler, the ones who can't afford it.
Even so, Las Vegas still had several thriving casinos, especially those
casinos which had redirected their marketing efforts toward "children" and
"families" by providing family entertainment to lure these previously
unexploited market segments into the casino gambling environment.
To both the financially troubled and the solvent casinos, the
handwriting was on the wall, but the solution was fairly obvious.
Unfortunately for the financially troubled casinos, only the solvent casino
interests had the resources to meet the problem of market saturation by
expanding into other geographic areas. The solution was for the casinos to
take their particular forms of gambling as "quickly" as possible' 7 to the
"largest population" areas possible, particularly to the unexploited population
bases. Serendipitously for the casino interests, by 1993 most states (37
including Washington, D.C.) 0 8 had already pre-conditioned their
populations to the acceptance of "legalized gambling" by fostering and
encouraging state lotteries.
Interestingly, over 25% of the state lotteries were reporting declining
revenues by early 1993,"° which would theoretically be expected not only

101. I. Nelson Rose, GamblingAnd The Law: 1992 Elections Endless Fields Of Dreams
14 (1992) (unpublished article, available from I. Nelson Rose, Whittier Law School).
102. ILL. ST. POLICE, DIv. CRIM. INVESTIGATION, INTELLIGENCE BUR., How CASINO

GAMBLING AFFECTS LAW ENFORCEMENT 13 (Apr. 16, 1992).
103. See Rose, supra note 101, at 13.
104. See William Petroski & Ken Fuson, River gambling dealt blow, DES MOINES REG.,
May 28, 1992, at Al, A2.
105. Thomas A. Fogarty, Steamboat move stuns, angers lawmakers, DES MOINES REG.,
May 28, 1992, at A1, A2; William Petroski, Riverboat casino firm didn'tfulfill promises,
DES MOINES REG., May 28, 1992, at A2.
106. Koselka & Palmeri, supra note 8, at 71.
107. See generally Rose, supra note 4, at 67-69.
108. Koselka & Palmeri, supra note 8, at 71; see also Millman, supra note 58, at 2.
109. Koselka & Palmeri, supra note 8, at 71-72 (referencing USA Capital, a Las Vegas
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from saturation of the lottery markets, but also from the partial migration of
the gambling dollars to the harder forms of gambling. For example, in
January of 1994, the Illinois Economic and Fiscal Commission reported that
for the Illinois lottery:
In FY 1993, total lottery sales declined $64 million, the
second decline in three years. It cannot be determined at
this time if the drop was due to additional competition
from riverboats, the lack of rollovers in FY 1993, or
simply a signal that lottery sales have matured and may
be on the verge of eroding."0
Whether this trend in the Illinois lottery continues, it is indicative of what
would theoretically be expected--particularly the migration of the gambling
dollar from the "softer" lottery to casino-style gambling. Interestingly, the
State of Illinois receives approximately 40 cents in tax revenue for every
dollar spent in the lottery,"1 but only 15 cents in tax revenue if that same
dollar is spent on riverboat gambling. Therefore, by legalizing riverboat
gambling, the State of Illinois may have hurt its pre-existing tax revenues
from gambling by $40 million (or more)," 2 while at the same time
creating more costs to the taxpayers by creating more compulsive
gamblers. 1 3 In this context, an Illinois candidate for Attorney General,
Martin Oberman, proposed that "the state take over riverboat gambling and
$1 billion] a year and pay a
its estimated gross of $600 million [actually
'" 14
owners."
boat
to
fee
management
10%
In any event, by first locating their casinos in large population centers,
the casino organizations would be virtually assured of being successful." 5
The casinos knew that in any population base (given some variables), the
starting point for calculating projected gambling dollars was at least 10% of

investment firm).

110. ILL. ECON. COMM'N UPDATE 1994, supra note 41, at exec. summary.

111. See 230 ILCS 10/13 (1992); see also, e.g., Tom Hernandez, Shell Game? Expert:
Casino a losing propositionfor Aurora, BEACON-NEWS (Aurora, Ill.), Jan. 27, 1992, at A1,
A5.
112. The calculation is $64 million - (15 + 40 x $64 million) = $40 million.
113. See, e.g., BETTER GOV'T Assoc., STAFF WHITE PAPER: CASINO GAMBLING IN
CHICAGO 2, 5, 14 (1992) (copies available from Better Gov't Assoc., Chicago, 11.).
114. Tim Landis, Betting dollarshitting limit?, ROCKFORD REG. STAR (Rockford, Il.),
Feb. 14, 1994, at Al, A2.
115. See, e.g., James Popkin & Katia Hetter, America's Gambling Craze, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP., Mar. 14, 1994, at 42, 43; see also "Roll Call America, Section I," American
Gaming Summit (Dec. 9, 1994) (industry reports on Wisconsin and Michigan) (partial
U. L. Rev.).
transcript available from N. I11.
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the public within a certain geographic range as guaranteed problem
economic gamblers spending 65% of the total gambling dollars." 6 The
two major conditioning factors that the casinos preferred were: (1) being in
large population bases and (2) being first into the given market area with
their particular form of gambling. Although proforma advertising could be
conducted to attract tourists, there would be little incentive initially to
advertise beyond the local geographic market, because if the two major
conditioning factors were substantially satisfied, the gambling facilities
would probably not need a single tourist to break even, because there would
be no prohibitions on gambling by local adult citizens--thereby, draining the
local population base." 7 For example, although the 1992 proposal for a
$2-billion casino complex in Chicago was hyped and sold to the public as
bringing 21-26 million" 8 "visits" or tourists'' 9 to the Chicago area, most
of those tourists were coming already 120 and spending their dollars in
traditional pre-existing businesses. In actuality, it appeared that Chicago had
9.3 million tourists in 199021 and 3.2 million business visitors in
1990.122 The business visitors for the entire Chicago metro-area were
projected at approximately 3.9 million for 1991.123 Overall, only 2.9
million "new" tourists could be expected. 24 This minor projected influx of
new tourists raised the problem of the "50-percent rule," which provides
generally that for a local economy to break even, over 50% of the patrons

116. See CLOTFELTER & COOK, supra note 7, at 92-94; see also supra notes 87-88 and
accompanying text.
117. See supra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
118. Skidmore, Owings & Merrill, CHICAGO INTERNATIONAL ENTERTAINMENT CENTER
4-5 (June 1992) (predicting 21 to 26 million visits as total annual attendance but not defining
"visits" per se as tourists, the local public, or both).
119. Since 70% of the "visits" were presumably "Out of Town," the tourist estimate is
probably 15-18 million tourists. The terms and calculations are nebulous. Id.
120. See Deloitte & Touche, CHICAGO GAMING COMMISSION, ECONOMIC AND OTHER
IMPACTS OF A PROPOSED GAMING, ENTERTAINMENT AND HOTEL FACILITY (May 19, 1992).
121. Id. at 45.
122. Id. at 50.
123. Id. at 51. The total number of tourists and business visitors for 1991 was
estimated at 16.8 million. Id. at 6. The subtotals, however, totaled only approximately 13
million and this 4 million discrepancy is difficult to pinpoint. See supra notes 118-20 and
accompanying text.
124. See Deloitte & Touche, supra note 120, at 45-51. Even though this report was
criticized as being sponsored by supporters of the casino complex (i.e., Mayor Richard
Daley), these tourist numbers appear to be accurate. Economically, casinos are a good bet,
CHI. TRIB., May 24, 1992, § 4, at 2 (reporting 2.9 million new visitors to Chicago)
[hereinafter Economically].
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cannot be either from the local population or from pre-existing tourists.125
Faced with the 50-percent rule, the supporters of the casino complex
suddenly revised their estimates up to "10.2 million new tourists"126_-a
highly questionable number. It should be noted that Nevada's economy
receives over 90% tourists from outside the state, thereby benefiting the
local economy.' 27 By comparison, a 1992 report indicated that only two
(out of seven) casinos in Minnesota received more than 50% tourists, and
tourist patrons2 of horse racing and the lottery were only 2-3% and 4%,
respectively. 1
Although public information on tourist patrons for the Illinois
riverboats was somewhat sketchy, the Peoria riverboat's own exit polls
conducted between November 20 and December 1, 1991 reported only 44%
of the patrons were from outside the Peoria area. 129 What proportion of
these patrons were "new tourists from outside the state" was unclear.
However, in 1993 the same riverboat released indirect information indicating
that only approximately 8% of its patrons were from out-of-state 30 (with
no indication of the proportion of "new" tourists).' 3' The apparently low
number of "new out-of-state tourists" meant that theoretically the Illinois
regional economy was not benefiting from this particular facility.
In similar economic scenarios involving concentrated legalized
gambling activities, enormous quantities of the current tourist dollars and
consumer dollars could be pulled away from the pre-existing economy and
into the casinos, where those dollars would become part of the new
125. See, e.g., John W. Kindt, Statement to the Task Force on Gaming in Illinois 2-3
(Apr. 7, 1993). According to Professor William Thompson at the University of Nevada at Las
Vegas, "When more than 50 percent of gambling is by locals ... gambling is a sure loser."
Peter Passell, The False Promise of Development by Casino, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1994, at
F5.
126. Chicago International Entertainment Center: News At A Glance, at 1 (undated)
(news release, probably fall of 1992, referencing Suite 510, 730 N. Franklin St., Chicago, Il1.
60610) (copy on file with N. ILL. U. L. REV.) (emphasis added).
127. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 20, at 5. See also 1994 THE WORLD BOOK
YEARBOOK 398 (stating that there are "more than 80 percent [tourists] in the case of
Nevada").
128. MINN. PLAN. OFF., HIGH STAKES: GAMBLING IN MINNESOTA 14 (1992) (reporting
on 7 of 16 casinos) [hereinafter MINN. PLAN.]. It should be noted that in 1993 there were 16
tribal casinos in Minnesota. MINN. PLAN. OFF., MINNESOTA GAMBLING 6 (1993).
129. Hernandez, supra note 111, at 5.
130. Robert W. Cook, Economic and Fiscal Impact of Riverboat Gaming in Virginia
2 (Nov. 1993) (prepared for the Virginia Riverboat Council, a sponsor of riverboat
gambling).
131. Even academics commissioned by the industry have been "not able to obtain hard
data on the number of new tourists." Id.
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gambling cycle. Since these dollars would generally be respent on in-house
marketing gimmicks, cluster services, and more and newer gambling
paraphernalia, the real resources lost' 32 would only tend to intensify over
time. Without ever bringing in a single tourist, however, just the local
population demographics in Chicago were and remained perfect for the
success of a casino complex. Such success would be at the expense of the
pre-existing Chicago economy without taking into account the enormous
drain on the Illinois taxpayers combined with the projected social- welfare
costs. The salient points were that tourists were unnecessary and that
drawing tourists was irrelevant to the financial success of the proposed
casino complex.
Unfortunately for the proponents of the casino complex, the
pre-existing legalized gambling interests in Illinois also understood these
basic tenets of gambling and the impacts on market saturation. The
pre-existing "softer" forms of legalized gambling, especially the horse
tracks,' 33 the off-track betting parlors (OTBs),'3 and the riverboat
gambling interests, 135 apparently did not want to compete with the
"harder" forms of gambling represented by typical forms of land-based
casino gambling, 36 because it was understood that gambling dollars would
tend to "migrate" from the softer to the harder forms of gambling. 37 This
migration of dollars and the concomitant reduction in the market shares of
132. See generally SAMUELSON, supra note 1, at 425 (stating that "gambling does..
absorb time and resources.").
133. See Ill. Horse Racing Act of 1975, 230 ILCS 5/2. (1992). In 1992, there were
seven horse racing tracks operating in Illinois:
(1) Arlington International Racecourse, Arlington Heights, Ill; (2) Hawthorne Race
Course, Cicero, Ill.; (3) Sportsman's Park, Cicero, Ill.; (4) Fairmount Park,
Collinsville, Ill.; (5) Balmoral Park, Crete, Ill.; (6) Quad-City Downs, East Moline,
Ill.; and (7) Maywood Park, Maywood, Ill.
134. As of 1992 the Illinois Horse Racing Act permitted 30 OTBs. By the end of the
summer of 1991, 21 OTBs were open. ILL. ECON. COMM'N, supra note 41, at 26, 28; ILL.
ECON. COMM'N UPDATE 1994, supra note 41, at 6, 12.
135. See Ill. Riverboat Gambling Act of 1990,'230 ILCS 10/1 (1992). The Illinois
Riverboat Gambling Act authorizes 10 gambling riverboats. See generally Barbara Powell,
The New Era of Riverboat Gambling, 36 FED. B. NEWS & J. 395 (1989).
136. See, e.g., Peat, Marwick, Mitchell, & Co., EONOMIC IMPACT OF LEGALIZED
CASINO GAMBLING IN NEW YORK STATE AND ITS IMPACT ON EXISTING FORMS OF
LEGALIZED GAMBLING (Feb. 1981).

137. ILL. ECON. COMM'N, supra note 41, at 41-46. In 1992, after only a year of limited
riverboat gambling, the Illinois "gambling dollars" were definitely migrating from the horse
tracks to riverboat gambling. For analyses of the elasticity issues involved in gambling
activities, see Donn R. Pescatrice, The Inelastic Demand for Wagering, 12 APPLIED ECON.
1 (1980); Daniel B. Suits, The Elasticity of Demand for Gambling, XCIII Q.J. ECON. at 155
(1979).
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various segments of legalized gambling were reflected in the anticipated
overall decrease in tax revenues to the state of Illinois.
[Illinois] Gov. Jim Edgar . . . warned [that]
legalization of land-based casino gambling could trigger
a surge in crime, boost law enforcement costs by
hundreds of millions of dollars and lead to losses of
existing jobs and state revenues.
Edgar predicted the state's overall take from
legalized gambling would actually drop by nearly $20
million if the proposed megaproject in Chicago . . .
[became] reality. Moreover, additional law enforcement
and regulatory demands would cost the state as much as
38
$60 million per year.'
Based on estimates by Mayor Richard M. Daley's
gambling commission,3 9 the state would realize $82.5
million in gambling taxes from the casino in its first full
year. But Edgar said lottery profits likely would drop by
nearly $35 million, riverboatgambling revenues would be
cut by about $40 million and horse racing taxes are
expected to lag by $26 million ....
Further, riverboat gambling revenues could drop even
more as they lose market share to the megaproject.'"
Although they historically refused to release their in-house data, the
legalized gambling organizations indirectly admitted recognizing this
tendency for the dollars to migrate.'
Interestingly, the president of
Circus, Circus, one of the corporate sponsors of the Chicago complex,
"predicted that, within five years, riverboat casinos would have saturated
138. See Terrance W. Gainor, Address at the Annual IAODAPCA Luncheon (May 8,
1992) at 10 (IAODAPCA stands for Illinois Alcoholism and Other Drug Abuse Professional
Certification Association). The Illinois State Police estimates that police services for casinorelated crime would exceed $100 million per year. Id.
139. See generally CHIcAGO GAMING COMMISSION, REPORT TO THE MAYOR (June 10,
1992) [hereinafter GAMING COMMISSION].
140. Press Release, Off. Ill. Gov. James Edgar, "Governor Warns Land-Based Casinos
Could Bring Crime Surge As Well As Overall Loss Of Jobs And State Revenues," Sept. 29,
1992 at 1-2 (emphasis added).
141. Patrick T. Reardon & Rick Pearson, Casino firms lose patience, CHI. TRIB., Dec.
4, 1992, § 2, at 1, 6.
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their market to such an extent that they would be offering coupons to entice
customers."' 142
It should be noted that this five-year time frame
corresponds to the predicted five years during which gambling organizations
generate their largest revenues and saturate the market, 143 as well as the
same five-year time frame for which tax waivers and concessions are
traditionally sought.' 44
In Illinois, the Illinois Economic and Fiscal Commission recognized
that "[a]s the State nears its saturation point, it is likely that competition for
the gambling dollar will increase among the various forms of
gambling."'145 The Commission also recognized that the "difficulty . . .
lies in determining the degree to which they currently compete as well as
how they will compete in the future, especially when there is very little
history of competition between the forms of gaming to study."'"
However, the Commission reported several results that supported the
"migration" of gambling dollars. For example, the Commission reported
that "the racing handle [gross monies wagered] has shifted from on-track to
off-track wagering,"' 47 as would theoretically be expected. It was also
concluded that "OTB facilities in close proximity to a riverboat can expect
''
to sustain a decline in total handle of approximately 5-15%. 148
Furthermore, in the context of riverboats, "[t]hose tracks in relatively close
proximity to riverboats seem to have suffered greater declines,
approximately 10% to 15% greater than those tracks further from
riverboats." '14 Also with regard to riverboats, the Commission noted that
lottery sales decreased in 1991 and 1993'5° and "to the degree the
competition does exist between
the two forms of gambling, lottery sales
5
would likely decrease."' '
These results paralleled a 1994 report by Dr. Robert Lawrence and Dr.
Robert Thalheimer in the College of Business and Public Administration at
the University of Louisville.' 52 This report summarized some general
142. Id. at 6.
143. Kindt, supra note 17, at 52 n.3.
144. Id.; see also Reardon & Pearson, supra note 141, at 6.
145. ILL. ECON. COMM'N UPDATE 1994, supra note 41, at 6.
146. Id.
147. Id. at exec. summary.
148. Id. at 8.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 9.
151. Id.
152. Robert G. Lawrence & Richard Thalheimer, An Economic Analysis of the Effects
of Casino Gambling on the Kentucky Race Horse Industry (C. Bus. & PUB. ADMIN., U.
Louisville, Jan. 1994).
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trends in some of these issue areas and concluded that the "evidence from
changes in handle in markets where casinos have recently been introduced,
• . . produces estimates of -31% to -39% '' 1S3 declines in the amounts
wagered at racetracks. Obviously, this impact was "expected to vary
depending on the location of the casino relative to population centers in the
racetrack market and to the price and quality of the product being offered
at the casino relative to the racetrack.'' 5
It is also interesting to note that the first two Illinois riverboats (and
one Iowa riverboat) opened in 1991 near three pre-existing Illinois horse
tracks, and within one year all three of the tracks experienced large
decreases in the gross monies wagered.155 Furthermore, one track, the
Quad City Downs, requested termination of racing within seven months after
the opening of a nearby riverboat. 56 These examples simply confirmed
what was already well-established; specifically, that the dollars tend to
migrate from the softer to the harder forms of gambling.1 57 What is
surprising was the speed and degree to which the gambling dollars
moved.'5 8
After the Illinois OTBs had proliferated pursuant to legislation in 1989
and again in 1991, and after riverboat gambling began operations in 1991,
those interests monitoring the gambling dollars knew that the 1991 Illinois
state lottery revenues decreased by $14 million. 5 9 By comparison, the
California lottery revenues were predicted to decline up to fifty percent in
1991 and 1992.' 60 In Illinois, however, the gambling interests also
recognized that certain types of gambling activities tended to take gambling
dollars from many softer gambling areas--probably including dog tracks in
nearby geographic areas.' 6' Sometimes within a period of only a few
153. Id. at 58.
154. Id.
155. ILL. ECON. COMM'N, supra note 41, at 44-46; see Reardon & Pearson, supra note
141, at 6.
156. See ILL. ECON. COMM'N, supra note 41, at 44-45.
157. Id. at 42-43.
158. Id. at 41-46.
159. ILL. ECON. COMM'N, supra note 41, at 65. These revenues were expected to
rebound somewhat in 1992, but not back to the 1990 level. Id. Revised figures in 1994
reported that the drop in 1991 was only $4 million. The lottery rebounded in 1992 by $70
million, but then fell by $64 million in 1993. ILL. ECON.COMM'N UPDATE 1994, supra note
41, at 17.
160. Virginia Ellis, Lottery Office Expenses Exceed Limit Set by Law, L.A. TIMES, June
17, 1992, § B, at 1, 4.
161. See Cary Spivak, Dog tracks running into financial problems, MILWAUKEE
SENTINEL, May 26, 1992, § A, at 1, 9. See generally Wis. GAMING COMM'N, 1991-92
ANNUAL REPORT (successor organization as of Oct. 1, 1992, consolidating the Wis. Lottery
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months, it appeared as if the dollars were already transmigrating from the
softer forms of gambling to the OTBs and riverboats. It also appeared that
the OTBs and riverboats were opposed to the potential Chicago casino
complex because they did not want those gambling dollars to move into
another harder category of gambling; namely, land-based casino gambling
in Chicago.
In Wisconsin in 1992, the gambling dollars were already apparently
migrating from the "softer" forms of gambling such as the five dog tracks,
which had just received their licenses in 1989, to the "harder" forms of
gambling such as casino gambling. 62 For example, "[w]hen the Oneida
tribe opened its casino near Green Bay... [in 1991, the] Fox Valley [dog]
,63 Statewide in 1992, the
track business dropped about 50% ....
Wisconsin Legislature Reference Bureau predicted a 32% drop in state
pan-mutual tax revenue for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1992.' 64 The
process of market saturation also appeared to be occurring in the Wisconsin
65
economy.1
Dog Track

1991 Profit/Loss

Dairyland
Kenosha, Wis.

$2.8 million

St. Croix Meadows
Hudson, Wis.

($4.3 million)" 6

Geneva Lakes
Delavan, Wis.

($2.4 million)

Division, Pai-Mutual Racing Division, Off. of Charitable Gaming, and Off. of Indian
Gaming) [hereinafter Wis. ANN. REP. 1991-92]; Wis. RACING BD., 1991 ANNUAL REPORT
[hereinafter WIS. ANN. REP. 1991]; WiS. RACING BD., 1990 ANNUAL REPORT [hereinafter
Wis. ANN. REP. 1990]. See also IOWA RACING & GAMING COMM'N, 1993 ANNUAL REPORT
[hereinafter IOWA ANN. REP. 1993]; IOWA RACING & GAMING COMM'N, 1992 ANNUAL
REPORT [hereinafter IOWA ANN. REP. 1992].
162. Spivak, supra note 161, at 9. Compare Wis. ANN. REP. 1991-92,.supra note 161,
at 12, with Wis. ANN. REP. 1991, supra note 161, at 20, and Wis. ANN. REP. 1990, supra
note 161, at 24.
163. Spivak, supra note 161, at 9. Compare WIS. ANN. REP. 1991-92, supra note 161,
at 12, with WIS. ANN. REP. 1991, supra note 161, at 20.
164. Spivak, supra note 161, at 9.
165. Id. Compare Wis. ANN. REP. 1991-92, supra note 161, at 12, with Wis. ANN.
REP. 1991, supra note 161, at 20.
166. This dog track opened June 20, 1991 and the calculated loss ,,was through
December 31, 1991. Spivak, supra note 161, at 9.
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Kaukauna, Wis.

($1.3 million)

Wisconsin Dells
Lake Delton, Wis.

$178,000'67
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The response of the dog track owners to the increased competition was
predictable--the owners demanded the legalization of "harder" forms of
gambling. Specifically, the track owners argued that "for the tracks to
survive they need[ed] unlimited simulcasting and the ability to offer the
same games and gambling machines--that is, blackjack, slot and video
betting machines--available at Indian casinos." 168 By definition, gambling
must continually become "harder" and/or expand into new population areas
in order to survive. 69 Business-economic history indicates that this
expansion process will never stop until the gambling activities are
recriminalized. 170 Apparently, some governmental officials are beginning
to realize what really happens with legalized gambling activities, and there
have been some interesting public statements:
[Former Wisconsin] Racing Board Chairman David C.
Mebane is openly hostile to expansion.
"It looks like these gambling lobbyists and fixers
want to have casinos and whorehouses on every corner,"
Mebane said.
Mebane dismisses the track owners' complaints as
"whining," saying they should put their time and money
into marketing their tracks.
"All of the people in this business are extremely
greedy and they want more and more and more all of the
time," Mebane said. "They're making plenty of money
with the strictest enforcement in the country.

167. This dog track had in reality, a negative cash flow. Id. It is perhaps significant
that these financial problems apparently went unreported and unaddressed by the governing
state agency. See Wis. ANN. REP. 1991-92, supra note 161; Spivak, supra note 161, at 9.
168. Spivak, supra note 161, at 9.
169. See Rose, supra note 4, at 67-69.
170. Id. at 82-83.
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"The state would be better off if there wasn't
gambling at all," Mebane added. "The gambling industry
and gambling proponents have an insatiable desire to
corrupt every public office holder they come in contact
with.

,,

171

Similarly, Governor Lowell Weicker of Connecticut, "a vocal opponent
of casino gambling in his home state"' 172 has a standard rejoinder: "[i]f
These
,,
you lie down with dogs, you get up with fleas ...
observations are simply part of the normal processes which occur when state
legislatures become infatuated with legalizing gambling activities.
In Iowa, the first state to begin riverboat gambling in 1991, similar
problems were apparent.' 74 State Senator William Dieleman, chairman of
the Iowa Senate Ways and Means Committee observed, "We are losing
control of the monster we have created with gambling in this state.' '175 The
1993 Annual Report of the Iowa Racing and Gaming Commission is replete
with references involving loss of market share between different operations
conducting casino-style gambling.176 Of the six authorized riverboats,
competition apparently caused two riverboats to leave during 1992, one boat
to close in 1993, and another boat to struggle for market share. 7 7 The
Iowa Commission reported that only one boat was successful. 178 With
regard to the three greyhound tracks and the one horse track, the migration
of the gambling dollars was apparently impacting all of the tracks, with
three of the four racetracks losing money and perhaps facing
bankruptcy. 179 The tracks' supporters pushed for but failed to get several
new tax concessions for the state's three dog tracks at Bluffs Run, Dubuque,
and Waterloo, Iowa, and for the horse track at Prairie Meadows near Des
Moines, Iowa." s ' This horse track was projected to be further subsidized
by the taxpayers and to remain open during the 1992 "season without having
171. Spivak, supra note 161, at 9.
172. Rita Koselka, How Lowell Weicker said no to gambling, FORBES, Mar. 1, 1993,
at 71.
173. Id.
174. IOWA ANN. REP. 1993, supra note 161, at 1-2; IOWA ANN. REP. 1992, supra note
161, at 1.
175. 'Losing control': Without assessment of gambling, expansion push persists,
TELEGRAPH HERALD (Dubuque, Iowa), Mar. 22, 1992, § A, at 4 [hereinafter Losing control].
176. IOWA ANN. REP. 1993, supra note 161, at 1-2.
177. Id. at 1; Petroski & Fuson, supra note 104, at Al, A2. See Fogarty, supra note
105, at Al, A2; Petroski, supra note 105, at A2.
178. IOWA ANN. REP. 1993, supra note 161, at 1.
179. id. at 2.
180. Id.; Losing control, supra note 175, at 4.
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a single horse circle the track; Prairie Meadows would only simulcast
races."' 8 In fact, Prairie Meadows did not have live horse racing from
the summer of 1991 until May of 1993.182 As Iowa State Senator Linn
Fuhrman summarized the problem of legalized gambling, "Enough is
83
enough.'t
In Minnesota, a study sponsored by the state strongly suggested that
U.S. market saturation was beginning to occur--particularly with regard to
land-based casino gambling."
Once the Indian casinos opened near
Minneapolis-St. Paul, many of the 7,675 passengers in 1989 who had flown
to Atlantic City from the Twin Cities were captured by the local gambling
market.' 85 Only 1,556 passengers flew to Atlantic City in 1990 and by
1991 the number of passengers was zero. 8 6 Similar declines in flights to
other out-of-state gambling destinations were also documented for the years
1989 to 1991."87 The "accessibility" of the Indian casinos, as well as their
social "acceptability," were cutting into the traditional casino markets. 88
Even so, these new Indian casinos were also creating a new market of
compulsive gamblers and problem economic gamblers, and thereby,
substantially increasing the socio-economic costs to the State of Minnesota.
However, in another development, the Illinois state government finally
recognized in 1992 what the internal data of the legalized gambling interests
had revealed years earlier: specifically, that every local and state economy
has an overall "market saturation point" for gambling dollars. The overall
data of the Illinois Economic and Fiscal Commission implied:
a saturation point where the introduction of a new form of
gaming no longer increase[d] spending for wagering.
This saturation point ...[was] difficult to project because
most of the states that have legalized new forms of
gambling were already below the national averages for
spending on wagering .... Moreover, the saturation point
probably varies for each state. Illinois may be close to
the saturation point as... [1992 wagering in Illinois was]
above the national average, above the national average for
181. Losing control, supra note 175, at 4; see IOWA ANN. REP. 1993, supra note 161,
at 2; IOWA ANN. REP. 1992, supra note 161, at 1.
182. IOWA ANN. REP. 1993, supra note 161, at 2.
183. Losing control, supra note 175, at 4.
184. See MINN. PLAN., supra note 128, at 16-17.
185. Id. at 16.
186. Id.
187. MINN. PLAN., supra note 128, at 16.
188. See Rose, supra note 101, at 15.
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the Midwest, as well as other geographical regions, and
above the average 9 for states which offer[ed] the same
forms of gaming.'8
Unfortunately, the governmental officials were still being misdirected in the
debate. The goals seemed to be a question of how much could be drained
out of the pre-existing economy of the state and which of the legalized
gambling interests would get most of the money. Apparently, little or no
thought was being given to the strategic economics of overall lost jobs and
lost consumer dollars, as well as the projected increases in tax rates, crime
rates, court costs, incarceration costs, social welfare costs, and associated
costs.
Given the undue haste with which the casinos were proposed and which
resulted in the resignation of the original chair of Mayor Daley's Chicago
Gaming Study for alleged conflicts of interest,'9g the Illinois Economic
and Fiscal Commission did not have the time to analyze land-based casino
gambling as part of its 1992 report, Wagering In Illinois.'9 Even so, the
Commission had examined potential impacts of riverboat casino-gambling
in the Cook County area which "could cause a 10-15% decline in racing
handle in that vicinity, and less decline as distance grows."' 92 Arguendo,
this supports the observation that the gambling dollars tend to migrate to
harder forms of gambling, and emphasizes the anxiety of the various
1 93
legalized gambling interests for guaranteed "geographic distribution."
In another example, the Fiscal Commission estiriated that an Illinois
"video lottery would generate $185 million in profits, offset by ... [a] $98
,94 "In South Dakota, every dollar
million loss to the state lottery ...

189. ILL. ECON. COMM'N, supra note 41, at 15.
190. Alf Siewers, Disarrayof panel blamed on haste, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Apr. 12, 1992,

at 67.

Id.

Critics of the mayor's gambling Commission said the resignation of its
chairman Friday over a potential conflict of interest underscores concern that
Mayor Daley is rushing too fast in a move to legalize casinos.
Meanwhile, an attorney for the Commission said it will bar the public
from some meetings.
[The] Commission Chairman ... announced that he was resigning because
a 35-acre tract north of Grant Park estate co-owned by his company may be offered
as a casino site.
191.
192.
193.
194.

ILL. ECON. COMM'N, supra note 41, at 7.
Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
See id.
Id. The following table indicates video lottery's projected impact on the lottery.
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spent on video lottery represented a 25% decrease in instant ticket sales, for

ESTIMATED IMPACT OF VIDEO LOTTERY
Before
Estimated
Game
Gross
Daily
$385.0
Pick-4
$115.0
Lotto
$610.0
Little Lotto $140.0
Instant
$430.0
Subtotal
Video
TOTAL

Estimated
After
Estimated Cannibalization Estimated
Net Revenue
Factors
Gross
$143.7
15%
$327.3
$42.6
15%
$ 97.8
$216.3
10%
$549.0
$ 50.9
15%
$119.0
$136.4
30%
$301.0

Change
Estimated
Net Revenue
$122.1
$ 36.2
$194.7
$43.3
$95.5

in
Net
-$21.6
-$6.4
-$21.6
-$7.6
-$40.9

$1,680.0

$590.0

$1,394.0

$491.9

-$98.1

N/A

N/A

$2,574.0

$185.3

$185.3

$1,680.0

$590.0

$3,968.0

$677.2

$87.2

LOSS TO LOTTERY = $98.1
STATE NET GAIN = $87.2
Table Notes:
The following assumptions were made in arriving at the estimate:
1. The net State revenue of the lottery before the introduction of video lottery is
$590 million.
2. Each of the lottery games would be affected by the following cannibalization
factors (cannibalization factors are the estimated percent decrease in gross ticket
sales)
Game
Cannibalization
Daily
15%
Pick-4
15%
Lotto
10%
Little Lotto
15%
Instant
30%
3. Video lottery terminals (45,000) would experience a $1,100 per week gross
resulting in a total annual gross of $2.574 billion. South Dakota is currently
experiencing a gross of $1,070 per week.
4. A State tax rate of 20% applied to the net machine income (net machine
income: total played minus 64% walk-away = 36%).
Id. at 74.
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a total decrease (erosion) in instant [lottery game] sales of 35-40%." 195
These examples not only confirmed that gambling dollars generally tend to
migrate to harder forms of gambling, but also raised the spectre that the
process leading to market saturation was accelerating," particularly in
Illinois and South Dakota. "Some of those involved in the gambling
industries fear that Illinois is at or near the saturation point for spending on
wagering.,

197

To combat the casino interests, the OTBs and horse racing interests
commissioned a study and hired experts who indicated that the horse racing
98
interests would lose 20-30% of their wagers (handle) to the casinos.
These results paralleled those of the Illinois Economic and Fiscal
Commission, which predicted that in a similar hypothetical case of Chicago
riverboat gambling, instead of land-based casino gambling, 10-15% or more
of the handle of nearby racetracks would be lost.' 99 By comparison, a
1981 study by Peat, Marwick, Mitchell, and Company "determined that the
markets for on-track betting and casino gambling overlapped and, if
authorized [in New York state], casino gambling would have a negative
impact on on-track betting." 2m It was projected that the New York race
tracks would experience an overall 13% decline in attendance and a 20%
decline in the amounts wagered. 20' Professor Richard Thalheimer's study
of New Jersey casino gambling reported that the race tracks experienced a

195. Id. at 73.
196. Id. at 42-46. The speed with which market saturation was apparently occurring
in some local economies was within one year, and it could easily be argued that the Illinois
communities in question were already saturated. Id.
197. Id. at 7.
198. The study sponsored by the proponents of the Chicago casino complex admitted
that the Illinois horse racing interests could see a revenue decline of 20-30% once the
Chicago casinos were in operation. Deloitte & Touche, supra note 120, at 204-05. See
generally GAMING COMMISSION, supra note 139. Economics Professor William Bryan of the
University of Illinois and Director of the Bureau of Economic and Business Research
calculated "a 25 percent loss of handle to the racing industry." RCF, INC., EFFECTS OF
CHICAGO CASINOS ON THE HORSE RACING INDUSTRY, 2 (May 26, 1992) [hereinafter RCF].
According to Deloitte and Touche, the Illinois riverboats would still "prosper," but "the
horse-racing industry could suffer a 20 percent to 30 percent decrease in revenue."
Economically, supra note 124, at 2; see R. Bruce Dold, How Chicago should cut the cards,
CHI. ENTERPRISE, May 1992, at 7. In a similar scenario which had occurred earlier in
Nebraska, skeptics claimed that the Nebraska legislature "wanted to protect eastern
Nebraska's only horse-racing track from competition," so 10 communities were banned from
operating video games. Id.
199. ILL. ECON. COMM'N, supra note 41, at 42-43.
200. Id. at 41.
201. Id. at 42.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15

7% decline in attendance and a 34% decline in the amounts wagered per
person in 1988.202 The New Jersey lottery, initiated in 1971, had caused
the racetracks to experience a 17% decline in the gross monies wagered.2 3
In the Chicago scenario, the three companies promoting the casino
complex released a study which they had commissioned and which argued
that the migration of dollars from the racetracks would only be 4%,2°4 and
when that argument did not persuade the horse racing interests, the casino
interests started making legitimate proposals "to cut the horse racing
interests in on the action. '21 Furthermore, it is perhaps significant that
the study concluded that "[o]nly about [10% of] patrons surveyed at
Arlington International Racecourse would go to the tracks less frequently if
land-based casinos were in Chicago, ''21 when it is remembered that this
10% of patrons could easily represent 33% of the gambling dollars.20 7 In
this context, Illinois State Senator Laura Kent Donahue indicated after the
1992 spring hearings of the Illinois State Legislature that it was obvious that
to get the casino complex, the casino interests would promise anything to
anybody.208 This observation was affirmed by the lobbying efforts of the
casino interests during the 1992 fall legislative session. During the fall
session, Illinois State Senator Earlean Collins of Chicago also indicated that
the projected social costs were of great concern despite the promises of the

202. See An Analysis Of The Impact Of Intra-State Intertrack Wagering, A State
Lottery And Casino Gambling On Parimutual Horse Race Wagering: New Jersey--An
Expanded Analysis, v, 30 (1992) (reporting data of R. Thalheimer, Univ. of Louisville)
[hereinafter Wagering]; ILL. ECON. COMM'N, supra note 41, at 42.
203. Wagering, supra note 202, at v, 30.
204. RCF, supra note 198, at 1 (critiquing the study pamphlet). The sample size is
quite small. This pamphlet reflects a typical "battle of the experts." Id. at 2. This pamphlet
was apparently paid for by the three companies sponsoring the Chicago casino complex. Ray
Long, Arlington would lose few patrons, study finds, CHI. SUN-TIMES, May 19, 1992, at 5
[hereinafter Study finds]. It is interesting to note that this newspaper article predates by 7
days the actual pamphlet to which it cites.
205. I11.St. Sen. Laura Kent Donahue, Statement before the Quincy Citizens Forum
(Oct. 11, 1992).
206. Study finds, supra note 204, at 5.
207. See supra notes 17, 87-88 and accompanying text.
208. Donahue, supra note 205. See generally Spielman, supra note 42, at 1, 34. Tom
Strong, Chicago may get riverboat casinos (AP), NEWS-GAZETTE (Champaign, Ill.), Dec. 5,
1992, § A, at 6. "Casino backers are busy writing amendments to the casino bill in an effort
to satisfy opponents." Rosemary T. Garhart, Wait until spring, NEwS-GAZETrE (Champaign,
Iil.), Dec. 2, 1992, § A, at 4.
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casino interests. 209 This concern was echoed by an influential Illinois
1°
public interest coalition, specifically the Public Welfare Coalition.
The casino interests indicated to the State of Illinois that they could "be
persuaded" to build a $2-billion euphemistically-named "Family
Entertainment Center" in Chicago and to guarantee that only 20% of the
2 11
Center would be devoted to casino gambling --although they apparently
component2 12
declined to build anything at all without the gambling
(which should tell the public something).213 The gambling interests were
obviously promising "everything to everyone," which undermined their
credibility. Some of the lobbying efforts of the casino interests were also
2 4 and letters of
challenged by Illinois Common Cause as being illegal,
Roland
complaint were sent by Common Cause to Illinois Attorney General
21 6
21 5 and Cook County State's Attorney Jack O'Malley.
Burris
Given these scenarios, there were questions involving what motivated
the casino interests to be so driven and so careless in their lobbying
activities. The answer was largely economic: "Government-regulated casino
and slot machine operations, with limited licenses for operators, can be
immensely profitable." 217 For example, in 1990 Circus, Circus, one of the
sponsors of the Chicago casinos, had opened the Excalibur hotel in Las
209. See Interview with Ill. St. Sen. Earlean Collins, WAND-Channel 17 (Decatur, 11.),
(Nov. 30, 1992) (following the Ill. Senate hearings on the Chicago Casino Proposal).
210. See generally Press Release, Public Welfare Coalition, "Anti-Casino Groups Call
For Maintaining Chicago's Social Fabric," June 8, 1993 (Chicago, I11.).
211. See generally Skidmore, supra note 118, at 4, 10.
212. Id. For examples of concerns associated with this issue, see GAMING COMMISSION,
supra note 139, at 16-17, 70, 74-75.
213. Id. See supra notes 53-67 and accompanying text.
214. The alleged violations involved the Illinois Lobbyist Registration Act, 25 ILCS
170/1-170/12 (1992). The complaints of Illinois Common Cause were enumerated in a press
release. Press Release, "Common Cause Calls for Investigation into Casino Violations of
Lobby Law," Aug. 5, 1992 (copy on file with 11.Common Cause, Chicago, I11.) [hereinafter
Common Cause Investigation]. First, Common Cause alleged that contrary to chapter 63,
paragraph 173 of the statute, the sponsors of the casino "had several individuals lobbying
legislators who were not registered with the Secretary of State as required by law." Id. at
1. Secondly, contrary to chapter 63, paragraph 176, it was claimed that the casino sponsors
had "not filed proper expenditure reports." Id. Thirdly, Common Cause suggested that the
"evidence points to the use of other registered lobbyists who have not declared legalized
gambling as a represented interest," contrary to chapter 63, paragraph 175(c). Id.
215. Letter from Tracy Litsey, Executive Director, 11. Common Cause, to Roland
Burris, Ill. Att'y Gen'l, (Aug. 5, 1992) (on file with Ill. Common Cause, Chicago, I11.).
216. Letter from Tracy Litsey, Executive Director, I1l. Common Cause, to Jack
O'Malley, Cook County, Ill. State Att'y, (Aug. 5, 1992) (on file with I11.Common Cause,
Chicago, Ill.).
217. Hearing, supra note 4, at 61 (statement of Professor Robert Goodman).
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Vegas, as the largest hotel in the country, but by fall of 1991 "the company
stunned market analysts by announcing it had already paid off the Excalibur
mortgage from operating revenues. '218 A gambling establishment which
could generate this scale of revenues while the United States was in a
recession should frighten the pre-existing Chicago businesses with the
spectre of economic cataclysm, because those pre-existing businesses would
be in direct competition for most of the local consumer dollars being
spiraled into the casinos. Field research indicates that from a conservative
perspective, most of the dollars going into the proposed casinos could
constitute a total drain out of the Chicago economy. This statistic presumes
that the casinos are making their best efforts to attract tourists who would
not otherwise be traveling to Chicago. For the casinos to "imply" that they
would attract enormous numbers of new tourists per year 2'9 to the Chicago
area is unsubstantiated--particularly since "market saturation" has been
occurring in several gambling jurisdictions across the country. Using the
casinos' own base-line data, 220 the casinos would definitely take 1.25
million tourists of the normal pre-existing tourists from other tourist
" ' and
attractions22
businesses and would "strongly attract" an additional
5.25 million away from other businesses.222
In 1984, for example, ten Nebraska communities with legalized
gambling via video-machines became saturated and their economies declined
(regardless of the large social costs), and thereafter, the Nebraska legislature
banned their video-machine gambling. 3 In this instance, the rapid
economic impacts, including the illusion of bona fide local tax revenues,
were to be expected, because video-machine gambling is widely-known as
"the crack-cocaine" for creating new compulsive gamblers amongst the
general public.
The base-line principle is that because of eventual "market
saturation"
gambling has to keep finding new competitive advantages to survive within
the gambling environment. Historically, these competitive advantages are
larger than those typically granted to or enjoyed by more traditional
businesses. Critics of legalized gambling suggest that one of the most
insidious and well-hidden unfair competitive advantages which the legalized

218. Coates, supra note 96, at 10 (emphasis added).
219. Skidmore, supra note 118, at 4-5.
220. See supra notes 30, 121-22 and accompanying text.
221. Id. For example, the 1990 baseline calculation would be: (.9.3 million tourists +
3.2 million business visitors) x 10 percent = 1.25 million.
222. Id. For example, the 1990 baseline calculation would be: (9.3 million tourists +
3.2 million business visitors) x 42 percent = 5.25 million.
223. Dold, supra note 198, at 7.

19951

LEGALIZED GAMBLING AND MARKET SATURATION

gambling organizations are usually granted consists of disproportionately
large direct and indirect tax breaks. 2 4 In many ways, taxpayer dollars
2z
directly and indirectly subsidize the legalized gambling interests.
One of the most authoritative 1994 non-industry studies was conducted
by the Florida Department of Commerce and the Florida Division of
226
Tourism which analyzed the research from across the United States.
The report, Implications Of Casino GamblingAs An Economic Development
Strategy,227 noted that as of 1994 there were 24 states that had authorized
casino-style gambling and that "by the year 2000, 95% of all Americans.
22
. . [were] expected to live within a 3-4 hour drive from a casino."
Accordingly, "market saturation" by casino-style gambling was identified as
Interestingly, the Florida Department of Commerce
a concern. 229
emphasized a study indicating that "being able to gamble" was "a low
motivator of tourism by Americans (18%). ''23o This Department of
Commerce also questioned the credibility of several standard industry claims
in this issue area2 3 ' and then summarized the authoritative research as
follows: "Evidence suggests that casino gambling would not bring in new
dollars or tourists, but instead exploit what already exists in the state. A
consistent result of the introduction of casino 232gambling has been the
cannibalization of pre-existing tourism industry.
224. See, e.g., Kindt, supra note 17, at 52 n.3; Hearing, supra note 4, at 77; Rock
Island gives tax rebate to floundering riverboat casino, (AP), JOURNAL COURIER
(Jacksonville, Illinois), June 28, 1995, at 1; Rock Island to give casino tax break, (AP),
JOURNAL STAR (Peoria, Illinois), June 28, 1995, at B6.

225. Id.

226. FLA. DEP'T COM. REPORT, supra note 4; see Fla. Dep't Com. Press Release, supra

note 4, at
227.
228.
229.

1.

FLA. DEP'T COM. REPORT, supra note 4.

Id. at 3; see id. at 6.
Id.

230. Fla. Dep't Com. Press Release, supra note 4, at 9 (citing the 1994 National Travel

Monitor by Yankelovich Research).
231. The Florida Department of Commerce addressed some of the casino-industry's
claims as follows:
Proponents say casinos Would boost tourism through incremental rises in the
number of visitors, the length of their stays in Florida and reduction of Floridians'
traveling out of state for casino gambling opportunities. Despite analysis of instate and national casino research, the Department has been able to find no data
to support these claims and substantial research and documentation that refutes

them.

FLA. DEP'T CoM. REPORT, supra note 4, at 2 (emphasis added). See also Hearing, supra

note 4, at 57 (statement of Professor Robert Goodman) (Decision makers "should avoid
reliance on information by researchers who work for pro-gambling constituencies.").
232. Fla. Dep't Com. Press Release, supra note 4, at 1 (emphasis added).
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Despite the concerns involving market saturation expressed by
individual states and even the legalized gambling industry, the U.S. national
economy is so large that it has the ability to inculcate various and numerous
legalized gambling activities before and after the year 2000. Some locales
could allow overbuilding in relation to the potential market for gambling
dollars,233 but overall saturation of the U.S. market appears unlikely for
the foreseeable future. 23 As governments continue to embrace legalized
gambling activities for the initial tax revenues generated and to ignore the
enormous social and economic costs which will eventually arise to haunt
them, issues involving market saturation will probably pale in significance.
These governments are developing new partnerships with
businesses in some of the most unproductive and
destructive sectors of the economy, helping to expand an
industry whose success increasingly depends on
cannibalizing dollars from other businesses and whose
expansion will create serious future problems for other
businesses and governments to deal with.
State and local governments have in effect created a
regressive industrial policy with the gambling
industry.235

233. Gary Putka, New England States Step Up Wagering On New Casinos, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 2, 1994, at A2. New England's six states are "far from oversaturation" according
to the chairman of Capital Gaming International. Id. "Foxwoods' revenue (gamblers losses)
will reach $1 billion" in 1994 according to a reported analysis by Arthur D. Little and Co.,
but the analyst:
notes that the projected new jobs at each [proposed] casino won't be a net gain for
the region, as many will come at the expense of attractions that will lose revenue
to gambling. Of the $4.1 billion in gambling revenue that Little sees under its most
expansive scenario .... [the analyst] reckons that 50% to 90% would be spent
regionally even if the casinos weren't built.
Id.
234. "The market will have to double and double again before the market gets close to
saturation, according to ... [industry insiders]" at the November 1994 Riverboat Gaming
Congress and Exposition held in New Orleans. Ed Bierschenk, Analysts say casino market
not saturated,ST. JOURNAL-REGISTER (Springfield, Ill.), Nov. 19, 1994, at 5.
235. Hearing, supra note 4, at 64 (statement of Professor Robert Goodman).

